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Abstract 
 Digital networked devices also known as Internet of Things (IoT) are ubiquitous 
today and are now a fundamental part of the functioning of the US digital economy and 
comprise a significant part of people’s daily activities. These devices have been shown to 
be insecure in general especially at categories that include any of the following: low-cost, 
home use, small business, and factory automation. There are continuing research and 
news reports showing Internet connected devices contain backdoors of various origins 
whether they be placed intentionally or are discovered as vulnerabilities. These types of 
devices are of concern because they are critical for Internet access, are deployed in mass 
numbers, and would have a significant impact to the US economy if a large percentage of 
these devices became disabled at the same time or were otherwise compromised and 
coordinated on a mass scale. People now use the Internet as a key part of their lifestyles 
today including for paying bills, shopping, and communication. Factories often use 
network-controlled devices as a part of automation and control. Should a mass number of 
these devices stop working, loss of these activities would represent a significant impact to 
the US economy and to people’s lives. In addition, given the fact that businesses have 
made technology a part of their business model, businesses no longer have the manual 
capabilities to accommodate manual processes on a mass scale. Given the widespread 
use, deployment, and dependency upon such devices, there exists the potential to disrupt 
the US economy and wreak havoc upon people’s lives. 
 Certification of digital internet devices is a relatively new development that is 
optional currently. Present certification methods use Blackbox testing methods that focus 
on input variability applied according to common vulnerabilities to provide assurance 
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that devices are free from known vulnerabilities which can typically allow backdoor 
access among other things. Certification of digital Internet devices needs to include more 
comprehensive testing including design and source code analysis to even have a chance 
at detecting intentionally hidden backdoors and assuring trust. Intentionally hidden 
backdoors are a growing concern and current methods of certifications are ineffective in 
detecting this kind of backdoor. In addition, results are presented from a survey presented 
to attendees of 2 major security conferences supporting the notion that testing alone is 
insufficient and should include design and source-code review. 
  
  5 
 
Chapter 1 – Overview 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the significance of Internet related technologies as a vital 
part of the modern US economy. The ongoing transition from older technologies to 
Internet related technologies is discussed to highlight the ever-growing implications. 
Internet technologies are indicated as critical and intrinsic to both businesses and 
consumers. 
1.1 - Introduction 
 The Internet is a communication technology that has become far more than the 
original inventors could have imagined. From the year 2000, the number of Internet users 
in the US has grown from 121 million to 279 million in 2014 (see figure 1 below). The 
total US population in 2014 was 317 million (Schlesinger, 2013). That’s 1 Internet user 
per every 1.1362 persons. 
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Figure 1 - (Internet Live Stats. (n.d.). Number of Internet users in the United States 
from 2000 to 2016 (in millions). In Statista - The Statistics Portal, n.d.) 
 
 Many kinds of traditional technologies have been displaced and become irrelevant 
because of the impact of Internet related technologies. For example, Plain-Old-
Telephone-Service (POTS) lines have their history to the earliest days of 
telecommunication when phones used rotary dial technology and circuits were switched. 
These type of phone lines are declining in deployed numbers. Conversely, Voice-Over-IP 
(VOIP) phone lines, an Internet enabled technology using more common IP packet 
switched technologies, are increasing in deployed numbers. Figures 2 & 3 below show 
from 2010 through 2016 that traditional phone lines declined by 28 million while VOIP 
lines gained 61 million lines over the same period. 
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Figure 2 – (Number of fixed telephone subscriptions in the United States from 2000 
to 2016 (in millions). In Statista - The Statistics Portal, (n.d.).) 
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Figure 3 –(VoIP residential and business telephone lines in the United States from 
2010 to 2018 (in millions). In Statista - The Statistics Portal, (n.d.).) 
 
 In addition to Internet technologies displacing older technologies, people have 
become accustomed to using the Internet as a part of their daily lives, and businesses 
have adapted their business models to conduct business leveraging Internet related 
technologies. In figure 4 below, the percentage of respondents of adult users surveyed in 
2017 included the following critical activities online banking 54%, e-commerce 72% 
(47%+15%+10%), and obtaining news 37%. 
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Figure 4 - (Most popular daily online activities of adult Internet users in the United 
States as of February 2017. In Statista - The Statistics Portal, (n.d.).) 
 
One consequence of businesses adapting their business models to incorporate customer 
tasks via Internet related technologies is an increase in automation and a reduction in 
labor. This means that if the Internet related tasks that customers now perform themselves 
were to suffer from a mass Internet based outage, businesses can no longer handle the 
workload that would be required to process those tasks manually. 
  
  10 
 
Chapter 2 – Backdoors and their risks 
 
 Devices of concern are special purpose computers connected to the Internet which 
lack adequate capability for security updates and which have projected volumes into the 
billions. These devices can contain intentionally hidden backdoors allowing them to be 
used in various kinds of mass attacks that could threaten the digital ecosystem. 
2.1 - Devices of Concern 
 A chief concern exists in the concept of intentionally placed hidden backdoors 
that could be used to compromise a mass number of devices that interface to the Internet. 
Security is based on a triad of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Hidden 
backdoors in Internet technology related devices can impact any one or more parts of the 
triad. For example, if most foreign made household routers and smartphones in the US 
were to have a hidden backdoor triggered that erased their firmware, the devices would 
forever stop working (also known as being “bricked”) which would be an example of loss 
of availability. Devices of most concern are devices that: 
1. use hardware logic chips (FPGA’s etc.) or firmware driven microcontrollers. FPGA 
devices never have their logic updated and firmware is rarely updated (if at all); 
2. are connected to the Internet; 
3. are deployed in large numbers; 
4. are devices made outside of the US where firmware and/or chipsets are proprietary and 
cannot be easily inspected to assure trustworthiness. 
 Devices of this type fall within a category of devices known as the Internet of 
Things (IoT). Network connected devices represent risk to the digital ecosystem as well 
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as the real world, and that risk grows as more devices are connected. According to figure 
5 below, there are forecast to be over 23 billion IoT devices in 2018 worldwide growing 
by over 350% to 75 billion by 2025. 
 
Figure 5 - Internet of Things (IoT) connected devices installed base worldwide from 
2015 to 2025 (in billions). (I.H.S., (n.d.).) 
 
IoT devices generally include commodity networked IT components, such as but 
not limited to routers, VOIP phones, smartphones, IP cameras, smart TV’s, smart 
refrigerators, and other “smart” devices. IoT devices are becoming widely deployed in 
the consumer sector and are integral to the fundamental functioning of the US digital 
economy as well everyday tasks in people’s lives. A recent survey of professional 
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software developers specializing in web applications indicates that their number one 
security concern was IoT devices (see figure 6 below). 
 
 
Figure 6 –Web developers security concerns (Abela, 2017) 
 
The risk of backdoors in IoT devices presents risk to the security of the USA as noted in 
the National Cybersecurity Framework (Framework for improving critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity, 2014). 
2.2 - Backdoors in Devices 
 A backdoor is defined by the US National Institute of Science and Technology 
(NIST) as “An undocumented way of gaining access to a computer system. A backdoor is 
a potential security risk” (N.I.S.T., 2015). This definition applies to devices as noted 
above because such devices comprise parts of a computer system. There are two 
categories of backdoors: inadvertent and intentional. 
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 Inadvertent backdoors are a result of software coding practices that either (a) do 
not follow known good security techniques which represent the majority of discovered 
backdoor vulnerabilities, or (b) are a result of a yet undiscovered bad practice. There are 
tests and certifications that are available to mitigate the risk from (a). When (b) is 
discovered, best practices are developed, and test and certification criteria follow. There 
is a great deal of research and attention to inadvertent backdoors; therefore, it is not a 
concern being addressed in this paper. 
 Intentional backdoors are more of a concern and the focus of this paper and are a 
result of a software development practice whereby a backdoor is designed into the code 
intentionally with or without authorization. Reasons for intentional backdoors include 
mandate from a government, debugging reasons, rogue programmer, and covert nation-
state Information Warfare espionage and infiltration. Also, of key concern is that 
intentional backdoors could be controlled by any country where many networked 
microprocessor/firmware and logic-controlled devices originate from. Intentional 
backdoors are not a new concept and have been discovered in various kinds of devices 
such as the following: 
 A former US Pentagon analyst stated in 2012 that China had pervasive access to 
80% of the world’s telecommunications through backdoors in Chinese manufactured 
Huawei and ZTE devices (Protalinski, 2012). ZTE smartphones distributed to the US 
were discovered to have a backdoor (La, 2012). Huawei routers were discovered to have 
2 notable vulnerabilities which can be used to take control of a device (Goldman, 2012). 
Huawei, a preeminent foreign network device manufacturer, is not allowed to be 
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procured by any critical US entities such as in military, government, and infrastructure 
use. Through leaks, the NSA and CIA were discovered to have articulated concerns that 
Huawei has links to the People’s Liberation Army. The NSA and CIA have developed 
exploits on Huawei routers that demonstrate serious vulnerabilities that are claimed to 
substantiate the claim. Huawei claims there is no link to the Chinese army and that any 
vulnerabilities were inadvertent (Hsu, 2014). 
 Ten million foreign made Coolpad smartphones were discovered to have what is 
believed to be an intentionally designed backdoor installed in them. The backdoor which 
included remote access and control was designed in such a way as to avoid detection by 
antivirus programs (Korolov, 2014). 
 The US government recognizes the risk of compromised firmware in routers and 
firewalls (U.S.-C.E.R.T., 2016) and currently requires equipment being considered for 
military purposes to be regulated and certified. As a substantiating example, according to 
a recent article, the US military has banned foreign made Lenovo equipment over 
concerns that evidence has shown some Lenovo equipment beaconing to unknown IP 
addresses (Gertz, 2016). 
 Moreover, researchers in 2012 created a novel method of scanning silicon and 
discovered an intentional backdoor built into the actual silicon of a popular Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) chip made outside the US and used for US military 
and critical applications, such as encryption (Skorobogatov & Woods, 2012). The 
implication of finding such a backdoor is that many more digital chips can have 
undetected backdoors hidden in their logic waiting to be exploited. The manufacturer 
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stated that the backdoor was made for debugging and would require a physical on-site 
presence to exploit it which was deemed low risk; elimination of the backdoor would 
have required another chip manufacturing cycle and therefore was a cost mitigation 
choice. However, if this was a known capability of the chip, and disclosure was not made 
a part of the specifications, one must question the motive of that statement. 
 Lastly, as an example of the reality of nation-state covert infiltration of a 
technology, the NSA has been implicated in masterminding the creation of trapdoors in 
common encryption algorithms. Trapdoors in encryption algorithms are achieved by the 
use of special known primes in the creation of the keys which allow a reduced set of 
possibilities thereby making it possible to crack encryption algorithms in a fraction of the 
time predicted by the algorithm’s design (Goodin, 2016). Thus, it is conceivable that a 
nation-state could either require its industries to add backdoors, or they could infiltrate 
the software code assets of its industries to achieve the same purpose. Complex software 
systems can be composed of dozens to hundreds of source and object code files; 
therefore, it’s entirely plausible that a backdoor installed through covert infiltration may 
not be discovered. 
2.3 - Ramifications of Backdoors 
 Today, a significant portion of the US economy is derived using the direct and 
indirect involvement of Internet connected technologies. According to figure 1 above, a 
significant portion of the entire population in the US uses the Internet. That means that 
social media sites are like digital habitats, and online commerce sites are like digital store 
fronts. These are popular elements of today’s digital ecosystem and today’s businesses 
have adapted their business models to depend on the Internet for critical payment and 
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communication functions. Should the Internet become inaccessible to consumers or 
businesses, today’s digitally dependent businesses would not have the resources to accept 
the volume of manual payments that would otherwise be required. In addition, businesses 
would not have the resources to effectively communicate with their consumers or their 
supply chains. Indeed, most businesses and consumers use VOIP related technology now. 
So, a systemic failure in the Internet could also cripple a significant portion of phones. 
Backdoors in computer devices have the demonstrated ability to affect the real 
world. For example, an iron factory in Germany experienced a damaging explosion 
caused by a computer-controlled blast furnace because hackers exploited vulnerabilities, 
gained unauthorized backdoor access to company systems, and programmed the blast 
furnace in errant manner (BBC News, 2014). Based on this mounting evidence, it is 
conceivable that there could exist widespread undiscovered intentionally placed and 
hidden backdoors which, if coordinated on a mass scale, could disable or disrupt the 
fabric of the digital economy effectively crippling the US with ramifications like an 
Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP). 
2.4 - Mitigating Backdoor Risks 
 Underwriters Laboratories (UL) was founded in 1894 with the goal of performing 
testing on materials for fire safety. By 1899, UL tested and published results of testing of 
electrical devices (UL history, n.d.). UL took on a legacy of testing electrical products 
and eventually providing certifications that became mandatory for electrical devices to 
mitigate fire risks. UL is a prominent Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory 
(NRTL). Today, all electrical devices that are plugged into power outlets must bear a 
NRTL certification mark by US federal, state, and/or local law to be sold. This level of 
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safety was undertaken to reduce the risk of fire related death and property damage. Like 
certifications, such as UL, that have become mandatory by law for electrical devices, that 
kind of rigor and regulation is needed in the digital realm. 
 Recognizing some of these concerns, the White House launched the Cybersecurity 
National Action Plan (CNAP) in February 2016 (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016), 
and Underwriters Laboratory followed up with a certification announcement for standard 
UL 2900-1 in April 2016 (Higgins, 2015). In May 2016, the International Computer 
Security Association (ICSA) Labs also announced a cybersecurity certification standard 
for IoT (Higgins, 2016). These new voluntary cybersecurity IoT certification standards 
are focused nearly entirely on Blackbox functional testing of finished product (ICSA 
Labs, 2016a). Blackbox testing is defined according to authors Gao, Tsao, and Wu, 
“Blackbox testing, which is also known as functional testing, is the testing that ignores 
the internal mechanism of a system or component and focuses solely on the outputs 
generated in response to selected inputs and execution conditions” (Gao, Wu, & Tsao, 
2003). The key to the success of these certifications is the scope of the certification and 
the methods they use to assure trust in the end-product. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Approach 
 
Given the importance of the digital economy and the risks that IoT devices 
convey to it and the fact that certifications are regarded a means to mitigate those risks, 
one must question the efficacy and completeness of such certifications. There are logical 
questions to ask. A starting place is, “are certified IoT devices trustworthy?” A Trusted 
Computing Base is defined by NIST as, “Totality of protection mechanisms within a 
computer system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the combination 
responsible for enforcing a security policy.” (Richard Kissel, 2013)  Thus, if any 
hardware, firmware, or software components are not trustworthy, then the computer 
system cannot be trusted. 
Research was conducted twofold. First, a survey was conducted at prominent 
cybersecurity conferences to ascertain cybersecurity experts’ opinions regarding factors 
underpinning the hypothesis. Second, a literature survey was conducted to assess the 
state-of-the-art regarding the effectiveness and applicability of current methods for 
assuring trust of IoT devices. 
3.1 - Research Questions 
Regarding intentional backdoors, a key problem is determining whether an IoT 
device can be trusted leads to the following three research questions: 
1. Cybersecurity professionals who deal with security matters on a day-to-day 
basis have an in-depth perspective regarding cybersecurity. This leads to a key 
question, what do technical security professionals think about risks from 
backdoors?  
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2. Also of interest, what do non-technical cybersecurity professionals think about 
risks from intentional backdoors? 
There are two major certification standards to address the security concerns of IoT 
devices: UL 2900 and ICSA Labs IoT Security Testing Framework. The testing methods 
used in those two standards were examined to determine the effectiveness of those 
certifications in detecting backdoors in IoT devices. This leads to the third research 
question. 
3. Can IoT devices that are certified using Blackbox testing methods, such as UL 
2900-1 and ICSA Labs IoT testing, be trusted to be free from all kinds of 
backdoors? 
3.2 - Research Methodology 
 
Survey Of Cybersecurity Experts 
Obtaining the opinions of cybersecurity experts was deemed a priority to validate 
the premise of the first research questions. A survey was developed. The survey consisted 
of 2 major sections: demographic and cybersecurity concerns. 12 questions were 
identified (see Appendix A for the full survey). 
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QUESTION RATIONALE 
1. Is the respondent technical or non-
technical? 
Technical cybersecurity people would likely 
better understand the methods for detecting 
and mitigating backdoor vulnerabilities. 
2. How many years of experience does 
the respondent have in cybersecurity? 
More experienced cybersecurity people would 
likely have a better feedback. 
3. What is the respondent’s highest level 
of education? 
Cyber security people with higher education 
levels may have better feedback. 
4. Levels of expertise by cyber area. Understanding respondents self-identified 
areas of expertise helps to understand context 
of answers. 
5. What country are you a resident of? Since the security of the USA is of question, it’s 
helpful to know the respondent’s residence. 
6. Cybersecurity risk geography concern. It’s important to know if respondents are more 
concerned about individuals versus city versus 
region versus nation versus global. 
7. What level of concern for each cyber 
risk by area regarding the USA? 
It’s important to know more specifically related 
to the USA what is the respondents concern 
about various risk areas especially the 
economy? 
8. What risk levels each vulnerability area 
contributes most to risk to the USA? 
It’s important to know how do various 
vulnerabilities score as contributing to 
concerns relative to Q7? (Internet of Things 
exploits and Backdoors among them) 
9. How important is it to have IoT designs 
and source code available for review? 
What is the respondent’s opinion about the 
importance of source code analysis to trust? 
10. How effective would testing be without 
designs and source code? 
What is the respondent’s opinion about 
verifying trust by testing? 
11. What’s the risk if most IoT devices are 
made outside the USA 
What is the respondent’s opinion about the 
trustworthiness of foreign made IoT devices? 
12. If most IoT devices were to be disabled, 
how long would it take to recover? 
What is the respondent’s opinion about the 
ramifications of a mass “bricking” attack using 
IoT? 
Table 1 – Survey Questions 
 
The first 5 questions were demographic in nature and the remaining questions 
were intended to identify respondent’s opinions on various cyber concerns. Prominent 
shows for professionals from both commercial/formal cybersecurity and hacker/informal 
cybersecurity were highly desired to get a blend of opinions from different perspectives. 
This led to selecting Black Hat USA 2017 and DEF CON 25 conferences held in August 
2017 in Las Vegas, Nevada as the shows are held back-to-back. Black Hat and DEF CON 
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are international conferences hosted for security professionals with more than 40,000 
attendees combined at the 2017 shows. Both shows are routinely listed on cybersecurity 
conference review websites as being among the best to attend (“The Best (Top Ten) 
Cybersecurity Conferences of 2017 - 2018 (Inc Videos),” n.d.). 
Paper format was chosen to facilitate maximum response rate from a survey to be 
administered one-on-one by a person. In addition, privacy is typically a big concern for 
attendees of DEF CON and this would preclude the use of an online format as no one 
would trust an online technology at such a show (“Defcon 2014: High-Profile Hacker 
‘Dark Tangent’ Talks to TIME | Time,” n.d.). 
Research Method To Analyze Trust In IoT Certifications 
 
 Research was conducted as to the types of Blackbox tests that comprise both UL 
2900 and ICSA Labs IoT certifications. Materials were obtained through the KSU library, 
through UL and ICSA Labs websites, and through general web searches. Through 
conceptual research analysis, each type of test used in those afore mentioned 
certifications are identified, categorized, and summarized. For the purposes of this 
analysis, an intentionally designed and hidden backdoor is defined as any method of input 
to trigger some unpublished functionality. A logical proof is then built to demonstrate the 
theoretical limitations of UL and ICSA Labs certifications relative to intentionally 
designed covert backdoors. Finally, research is correlated that has promise for being a 
more complete method for assuring trust in IoT devices. 
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Chapter 4 – Research Findings 
 
The survey certainly conveyed a distinct concern about IoT devices among 
cybersecurity experts. The survey findings correlate with this research showing that the 
UL and ICSA Labs certifications are simply not capable of detecting the class of 
backdoors that are intentionally designed to be hidden and placed into an IoT’s device 
software as a part of the software development life cycle. 
4.1 - Cybersecurity Expert Opinions 
120 hardcopy surveys were personally administered to Black Hat and DEF CON 
attendees who had conference badges displayed on their person and who were standing in 
various lines around the conferences. Approximately 80% of the surveys were 
administered by a white, US-born female with the balance administered by a white, US-
born male. Both survey administrators stood by while the participants completed the 
surveys. We received back 120 surveys. Seven surveys were returned over half 
incomplete and not counted. Thus, there were 113 completed surveys. The completion 
rate is 94%. 
Survey respondents self-identified themselves as “technical” and “non-technical” 
for the purpose of isolating technical respondent’s opinions which are deemed more   
relevant to cybersecurity related concerns which are inherently technical in nature. Of the 
total respondents, 85 (75%) identified themselves as having a technical role in the 
cybersecurity industry. Of note, 34 (30%) identified themselves as having a non-technical 
role (6 counted themselves as having both technical and non-technical roles within the 
cybersecurity industry). 
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Survey respondents were from 13 different countries and an overwhelming 
majority (82%) are from the US. 46% of respondents have a bachelor’s degree as their 
highest level of education and 38% of them have a graduate degree or higher. Most of the 
respondents (66%) have more than 5 years working experience in the security industry 
and 48% of them have worked in security field more than 10 years. 
Regarding levels of expertise within the cybersecurity industry across 20 
cybersecurity categories, respondents rated themselves on an integer scale from 0 (no 
experience) to 5 (expert). Survey responses were averaged together. In figure 7 (follows) 
all areas of expertise are listed vertically and technical respondents self-identified 
(highest average scores) are represented horizontally. The top 3 expertise categories were 
“Computer security,” “Network security,” and “Security architecture” which averaged to 
the highest values representing a greater self-identified expertise. These kinds of experts 
would likely be able to provide relevant opinions regarding IoT devices. 
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Figure 7 – Areas of expertise (technical respondents) 
 
The intent of the survey was to assess what security experts think about general 
cybersecurity concerns and more specifically what they think about risks from IoT 
devices. Among respondents concerns about risk as it applies to a scope of geography, 
respondents indicated their concern on an integer scale of 0 (no concern) to 5 (grave 
concern) ranging from the individual person to local to regional to national to global. 
Technical respondents felt that “national security” and “individual security” both tied as a 
top concern, followed by global security, regional security, and local security. Non-
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technical respondents had similar thoughts but didn’t quite feel as concerned as their 
technical counterparts about “individual security”. National security is a key area of 
correlation to the risk that IoT devices convey. 
 
Figure 8 – Concerns by geographic area 
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On the same scale as above, regarding a focus on US cybersecurity risk areas, 
technical respondents felt the top 2 were most concerning: “infrastructure”, and “digital 
economy”. Of significance, concern over the digital economy correlates with the risk that 
IoT devices convey to the economy. Non-technical respondents top 2 categories were: 
“infrastructure”, and “government”. Technical and non-technical respondents differed 
mostly in concern for businesses where technical respondents were not as concerned. 
Figure 9 – Respondent concerns for the USA 
 
Regarding various types of risks that are associated with technologies, the 
technical and non-technical respondent’s concerns were averaged and are reflected in 
table 1 below (note the table was sorted by concern from highest to lowest according to 
technical respondents’ results): 
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Security Vulnerability  Technical Respondents Non-tech Respondents 
OS unpatched exploits 4.24 4.03 
Spear-phishing attacks 4.06 3.78 
Phishing attacks 4.05 3.8 
Malware software 3.84 3.62 
Browser unpatched exploits 3.8 3.43 
Web apps unpatched exploits 3.77 3.48 
Internet of Things exploits 3.74 3.47 
Backdoors hidden in digital connected devices 3.72 3.57 
Cloud unpatched exploits 3.59 3.68 
OS zero-day exploits 3.59 3.79 
Browser zero-day exploits 3.48 3.21 
Web apps zero-day exploits 3.36 3.28 
DNS unpatched exploits 3.33 3.59 
Cloud zero-day exploits 3.3 3.39 
DNS zero-day exploits 3.22 3.38 
Table 2 – Concerns by technology (1=low risk, 5=high risk) 
 
 It is clear from the survey results that all respondents felt that all areas queried 
were of above average (3.00) concern and it is of special note that “Internet of Things 
exploits” and “Backdoors hidden in digital connected devices” fell in that category. 
 
The generally accepted method for assuring software source code trust is via 
source code analysis and formal verification (Hartnett 2016). An overwhelming majority 
of respondents, 84% of technical and 88% of non-technical, thought that source code 
analysis was important, more-than-important, or absolutely-vital for cybersecurity 
purposes. This correlates strongly with this research and emphasizes the importance of 
design and source code analysis. Moreover, 59% of technical respondents and 71% of 
non-technical respondents felt that testing such devices would be somewhat to not 
effective without source code analysis. This reinforces the validity of the importance of 
design and source code analysis. 
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Figure 10 – Source code review importance by respondent’s percentage 
 
Finally, key results of the survey indicate that backdoors hidden in digital 
connected devices represent a significant concern among respondents, especially DEF 
CON respondents. 56% of all technical respondents and 65% of DEF CON respondents 
(the hacker perspective) thought that foreign made IoT devices could present a high to 
grave risk to US national security. Again, this correlates to the research presented below. 
Finally, 56% of Black Hat technical respondents felt that it could take longer than 90 
days to recover from an attack involving millions of devices (three orders of magnitude 
less than the billions of IoT devices already in use). 48% of all technical respondents and 
50% of all non-technical respondents agreed. This correlates with significant risk that IoT 
devices convey to the US digital economy. 
Thus, it can be concluded from this survey that according to cybersecurity experts 
there is merit in questioning the efficacy of testing digital Internet-connected devices, 
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which includes IoT devices, using predominantly Blackbox techniques and omitting 
design review and full source code analysis. 
4.2 - Certifications For IoT Devices 
Presently, two companies offer certification of IoT devices; Underwriters 
Laboratories offers UL 2900, and ICSA Labs offers an Internet of Things certification. 
Both certification methodologies focus almost exclusively on Blackbox testing. Both 
certifications are designed to provide detection of unintentional backdoors as is common 
to known vulnerabilities. The scope of both certifications does not provide for detection 
of intentionally designed covert backdoors. 
 Note that by definition, Blackbox testing focuses on known patterns of failure 
common to a class of software being tested. This is especially true as indicated in UL 
2900-1 in which all tests are relative to a known standard. Thus, it is conceivable that a 
backdoor could be intentionally added to source code and encoded to only trigger based 
on some special unique input sequences; therefore, testing as stipulated in UL2900-1 
would not be suited to detect intentionally placed and hidden backdoors. Even static 
source code analysis as mentioned in UL2900-1 is specifically geared toward comparing 
software source code to known bad patterns in an effort to provide assurance that the 
code is free from known coding problems (Underwriters Laboratory, 2017). While this 
approach is sufficient for identifying vulnerabilities due to known coding problems, it 
does not address intentionally placed hidden backdoors. 
 ICSA Labs, an independent division of Verizon, also offers a certification 
program for Internet of Things devices. In ICSA’s Internet of Things (IoT) Security 
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Testing Framework version 2.0, they include a diagram (see figure 11) which indicates 
the scope of testing and by definition is a Blackbox approach: 
 
Figure 11 - (ICSA Labs, 2016a) 
 
In addition, in that same document, ICSA Labs has a section on “Potential IoT Product 
Requirements” which at a high-level covers good-practices recommended for 
cryptography, communications, authentication, physical security, platform security, and 
alerting/logging. While all this is certainly good, like UL 2900, ICSA Labs lacks design 
review and source code analysis with the goal of semantic understanding of the 
implementation to verify strict compliance with the intent of the product.  
4.3 - UL-2900-1 
 Underwriters Laboratories has made progress toward a safer IoT ecosystem by 
creating standard UL 2900, “UL Standard for Safety for Software Cybersecurity for 
Network-Connectable Products”. This standard includes UL 2900-1 general requirements 
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which would apply to IoT devices for home use (excluding medical devices and 
excluding . UL 2900-1 is the broader standard that is more applicable to general IoT 
devices. The standard is broad, but the context generally focuses on the security best 
practices of IoT products relative to the scope of known vulnerabilities in the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) rather than being development process focused with trust 
being a key part of source code review. 
Section 1 Scope of UL 2900 establishes limits of the standard as “This standard 
applies to network-connectable products that shall be evaluated and tested for 
vulnerabilities, software weaknesses and malware” (Underwriters Laboratory, 2017). The 
standard further goes on the establish limits for the standard, “… this standard contains 
no requirements to verify that the product functions as designed” (Underwriters 
Laboratory, 2017).  This is an important statement because if a covert backdoor is made a 
part of the requirements, then this standard would be insufficient to detect that condition. 
The standard goes on to define various methods for testing for known weaknesses. 
Again, intentionally designed backdoors are not within scope of the standard. Finally, the 
standard does begin to approach source code analysis, but only from the perspective of 
using automated tools to review the source code in section 17, Software Weakness 
Analysis, “…products shall contain no weaknesses in any of the evaluated source 
code…to verify compliance…methods for finding software weaknesses shall be 
applied…static code analysis, static binary and bytecode analysis” (Underwriters 
Laboratory, 2017). 
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Automated tools do not have intelligence to be able to understand the context of 
what source code is doing relative to the design documents. Indeed, many human 
programmers would have a hard time doing the same. 
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Table 3 summarizes what UL 2900-1 specifies (Underwriters Laboratory, 2017): 
Area Description Effective 
Detecting 
Intentional 
Backdoors? 
1. Product 
Documentation 
The product vendor provides documentation to UL for 
review of functions related to design, security, and 
management. All interfaces of physical and logical, 
remote and local, inputs and outputs are documented 
including files and protocols. Source and binary code is 
to be provided for automated analysis. Software build 
process is documented. 
No 
2. Product Design 
Documentation 
For security risk analysis (see 9) and evaluation of risk 
controls (see 4-9). 
No 
3. Documentation 
For Product 
Use 
Supporting cybersecurity objectives of UL 2900-1, 
security considerations, environment for intended use, 
instructions for effectiveness of security controls, all 
external interfaces and associated protocols, version 
numbers and libraries, security related event log 
explanation (see 8), recommended configuration and 
settings to maintain security in a given environment, 
documentation on authentication robsustness. 
No 
4. Risk Controls The product shall comply with all security controls (see 
5-8) unless exceptions still provide security as 
documented and explained by the vendor (see 9). 
No 
5. Access Control, 
User 
Authentication 
And User 
Authorization 
This prescriptive section defines product access and 
management functions, requirements, and other 
specifications for authentication best practices. 
No 
6. Remote 
Communication 
This section specifies integrity and authenticity 
requirements for data communication over a remote 
interface. 
No 
7. Sensitive Data This section specifies confidentiality and best practices 
for sensitive and personally identifiable information. 
No 
8. Product 
Management 
This section specifies the product capability for software 
updates and authenticity of such updates, logging 
requirements, data erasure. 
No 
9. Vendor Product 
Risk 
Management 
Process 
Per this specification, the vendor is required to establish 
and document risk management analysis during product 
design. This process documents threats, vulnerabilities, 
likelihood, risk level, risk management criteria, risk 
controls compliant with 4-8, and known vulnerabilities, 
residual risk level assessment. This process is focused on 
“known (types of) vulnerabilities in the product”. 
No 
10. Known 
Vulnerability 
Testing 
This section states that the product shall contain no 
known vulnerabilities unless noted and documented. 
The product shall be tested for known vulnerabilities 
relative to the National Vulnerability Database. 
No 
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11. Malware 
Testing 
Binary and bytecode shall be scanned by at least 1 
malware detection tool. 
No 
12. Malformed 
Input Testing 
The product shall be resilient to malformed input. No 
13. Structured 
Penetration 
Testing 
The product displays no vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited from susceptibility to penetration testing 
within a 2-minute test scenario. 
No 
14. Software 
Weakness 
Analysis 
No weaknesses shall be present except for those that are 
deemed acceptable. 
No 
15. Static Source 
Code Analysis 
All source code shall be analyzed with static analysis. No 
16. Static Binary 
and Bytecode 
Analysis 
All binary and bytecode shall be analyzed by static 
analysis. 
No 
Table 3 - UL 2900-1 summary (Underwriters Laboratory, 2017) 
 
Although one might hope that item 15 in table 3 above, “Static Source Code 
Analysis” might be helpful in detecting intentional backdoors, the realization is that static 
source code analysis is limited to detecting coding flaws only, and it is not possible to 
validate designs. For example, according to Dejan Baca in the article, “Evaluating the 
Cost Reduction of Static Code Analysis for Software Security,” using static code analysis 
they only observed a “30% success rate of detecting known vulnerabilities” (Dejan Baca, 
Bengt Carlsson, & Lars Lundberg, 2008). The article further goes on to describe the static 
code analysis as finding common mistakes and errors made during the coding process. 
The context of the article implies that static code analysis does not approach the realm of 
being able to detect intentional covert backdoors. 
4.4 - ICSA Labs Internet of Things (IoT) Security Testing Framework 
 
ICSA Labs also has a IoT certification. ICSA Labs differs from UL in that UL is a 
long-established testing laboratory and well known standards body. ICSA Labs is a 
private subsidiary of Verizon and is focused on providing third-party product assurance 
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for businesses and individuals since 1989 (“About ICSA Labs | ICSA Labs,” n.d.). ICSA 
Labs is not a standards authority and does not publish any standards. Rather, ICSA Labs 
is focused on the testing aspect of product assurance. Fewer details are available about 
their certification methods than could be obtained for UL. In an email inquiry to ICSA 
Labs, they responded very tersely saying that their IoT testing was “essentially black box 
testing.” According to the information that they do publish on their website, nothing 
appears to contradict that statement. 
Table 4 - ICSA Labs Potential Product Requirements: 
Area Description Effective 
Detecting 
Intentional 
Backdoors? 
1. Cryptography Must support various FIPS, NIST, and IETF standards 
for algorithms, crypto strength, ciphers, and PRNG. 
Must use best practices to disable insecure parts of 
such algorithms. Must protect access to security 
parameters. Must prevent unauthorized key entry. 
Must prevent transport of critical keys via its 
interfaces. 
No 
2. Communications Must support best practices in data communication 
providing authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and 
reply protection. Cryptographic authentication for 
communication between peers is required and proper 
validation of peer credentials. Non-secure protocols 
must require an authorized administrative action to 
allow. Must prevent unauthorized traffic from 
traversing different interfaces. Physical interfaces must 
be disabled OR must allow only authorized access 
while being invulnerable to attack. 
No 
3. Authentication As applicable to all interfaces, authentication must be 
supported for admin access. Strong authentication 
must be used for all users. Upon first use, unique id and 
credentials must be configured. Privilege escalation 
without admin authorization is prohibited. Must 
prevent enumeration of accounts. 
No 
4. Physical Security Devices must have visible tamper evident mechanisms. 
Unauthorized access to physical components must be 
prevented. Tamper detection should send alerts, zero 
private keys, and disable the device itself. 
No 
5. Platform 
Security 
The platform must be invulnerable to known exploits 
while being resilient to DOS attacks. It must also have a 
No 
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verifiable secure boot mechanism and must support 
secure remote updating. Finally, the platform requires 
a real-time clock accurate to 1 second per day and that 
maintains integrity even without external power. 
6. Alerting/Logging Must be capable of sending time stamped alerts 
whenever an upgrade is initiated, upon attempts to 
gain admin access, upon tamper detection, upon attack 
detection, when changing from secure to non-secure 
interfaces, when sensitive data comm settings are 
changed, and when the device is reset to factory 
defaults. 
No 
Table 4 - ICSA Labs Potential Product Requirements (ICSA Labs, 2016b) 
 
4.5 - Blackbox Testing Not Intended To Assure Trust 
The traditional approach to software development has been phased. For purposes 
of this discussion, a simplification of various development models include development 
as a phase and testing as a phase (among other phases which are not important to this 
discussion). The testing phase follows the development phase and its purpose is to 
empirically test the software after a development phase, if defects are detected, the 
severity of the defect(s) are assessed and the phase returns to development if defects 
detected are deemed significant. If defects are not deemed significant, or there are no 
defects, then the phase progresses beyond testing. This approach to software development 
has been taken because for any program of sufficient complexity, it is practically 
impossible to prove that such a program will satisfy the requirements. Rex Black states in 
his book, Pragmatic Software Testing, 
…Software testing is not about proving conclusively that the software is free from 
defects, or even about discovering all the defects. Such a mission for a test team is 
truly impossible to achieve. 
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Why? Consider any system the solves complex business, scientific, and military 
problems. There are typically an infinite or practically infinite number of 
sequences in which the programming language statements that make up such a 
system could be executed. Furthermore, large amounts of tremendously diverse 
kinds of data often flow not only within each subsystem but also across 
subsystems, with features influencing other features, data stored earlier being 
retrieved again later, and so forth. Finally, users will use systems in unintended, 
often impossible-to-anticipate fashions, eventually even on system configurations 
that did not exist when the software was being written (Black, 2011).  
 
Let p be “Black box testing cannot 100% confirm software meets design specifications” 
Let q be “IoT certifications primarily rely on black box testing” 
Therefore 
p → q 
 
“IoT certifications cannot be trusted” 
Figure 12 – logic proof “IoT Certifications Cannot Be Trusted” 
 
Intentionally designed and hidden backdoors would not be detected by standards 
that are limited strictly to Blackbox testing methods and testing against known 
deficiencies; therefore, devices bearing an IoT certification mark from UL or ICSA Labs 
still cannot be trusted. 
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4.6 - Hope For The Future 
So, must we give up hope that IoT devices can never be trusted? The answer is 
no. A solution is to use special software development techniques known as formal 
methods. Historically, formal methods have been a manual time-consuming process 
requiring special highly trained people and these methods were only applicable to 
software of less-than practical complexity. Per Dr. Kathleen Fisher, recent advancements 
in technology and techniques have made formal methods more practical for use in 
proving software. In Dr. Fisher’s paper, “The HACMS program: using formal methods to 
eliminate exploitable bugs,” she describes the use of judiciously applied formal software 
verification methods to create a software flight system that in testing appeared to be “un-
hackable” (Fisher, Launchbury, & Richards, 2017). 
Building on Fisher’s ideas, IoT devices are simplistic and the scope of what these 
devices do is inherently limited. Therefore, these devices are ideal candidates for formal 
proofs. Indeed, in Fisher’s work, she describes a quadcopter device in which its software 
was rewritten using formal methods to produce software that perfectly matched its 
requirements for the critical functions. 
Therefore, a certain way to detect intentional backdoors in IoT devices is to 
validate that the design does not contain any intentional backdoors and then to use a 
process that is known to produce software that is 100% verifiable to the design and apply 
such processes to the critical functions of the device which make it a risk to the digital 
ecosystem. Namely, the Internet data interface. Today, this can be accomplished by 
creating a formal specification followed by a formal design and then formal verification; 
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once the design is validated, then a trusted build process would have to be performed to 
produce the binary code. 
Because of the expense of such techniques, it would make sense to abstract IoT 
software to a re-usable model that could be formally verified and then adapted for many 
different IoT purposes thus minimizing further formal verification work and minimizing 
associated costs. Incorporating formal methods into a mandatory certification process 
would drive up the cost of IoT devices, but with there estimated to be some many devices 
in the future, the unit impact would likely be negligible, and costs would diminish as 
expertise and maturity in this area grew. 
 
  
  40 
 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
The survey of cybersecurity experts supports the notion that IoT devices are 
indeed a concern, that testing methods alone are not sufficient, and that these kinds of 
devices put the US economy at risk. The research performed in this work shows that IoT 
certifications rely principally on Blackbox testing techniques and that such techniques are 
insufficient to detect all types of backdoors. Therefore, the survey findings and the 
research from this work together support the statement, “certified IoT devices remain 
untrustworthy”. 
In addition, it should be noted that both UL and ICSA Labs have made statements 
making clear there are limitations to their testing; thus, the IoT certifications from UL 
and ICSA Labs were never meant to be an all-inclusive method of assuring trust. Alone 
they are not sufficient to assure that IoT devices are trustworthy, and this is further 
emphasized in the logic proof. 
Regarding software trustworthiness, formal software proofs have been the 
traditional theoretical method of providing assurance that software can be trustworthy. 
Noting that software proofs are only practical for software of limited scope, one can see a 
correlation to IoT as the software running on them is inherently limited in capability as 
IoT devices do very specific tasks. 
5.1 - Limitations Of This Work And Future Efforts 
The survey results showed that confusion existed about demographic question 4 
with there being 20% non-conformant answers. Fortunately, this was not deemed critical 
to this survey. This question could be improved nevertheless. In addition, the overall 
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formatting of the survey could be improved to make it more user friendly. Also, the 
survey could be enhanced with more questions to improve cross-checking of answers. 
Finally, more cybersecurity conferences could be selected to obtain an even broader 
perspective. 
 The research presented in this work is theoretical. With appropriate funding 
estimated to be in the 6-figure range, empirical evidence could be obtained by embedding 
a covert backdoor in a complex open-source software project for submission to UL and to 
ICSA Labs to confirm that a certification could be obtained with such a backdoor intact. 
Further, work could be done to build on Fisher’s work applying it to the IoT domain 
creating an abstracted IoT infrastructure that compartmentalizes the critical portions of an 
IoT device making it trustworthy.  
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Chapter 7 – Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Survey Questionnaire 
 
  49 
 
 
 
  
  50 
 
Appendix B – Survey Results Charts 
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Q4: What are your levels of expertise within the cybersecurity industry (mark all that apply where you have expertise, put 
a number 1 through 5 where 1 = novice and 5 = expert, 0 = no experience)?
(all technical respondents minus 20% non-conforming answers due to errant question)
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Q8: What cybersecurity risk area do you think is the greatest contributor to the risk areas noted above (use 1 
through 5 where 1 = low risk contribution and 5 = high risk contribution)?
(all technical respondents)
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not important
somewhat important
important
very important
absolutely vital
Q9: Modern connected devices incorporate digital logic and/or firmware which is incorporated in network 
routers, network switches, computers, smartphones, car computers, IP video cameras, Smart TV’s, 
etcetera.  Most manufacturers of these devices have proprietary private designs and firmware which may 
or may not contain hidden backdoors.  Such backdoors could be used to disable such devices.  How 
important do you think that designs and software related source code for such devices be available for 
analysis for security purposes? 
(all technical respondents)
16%
43%
17%
17%
7%
not effective
somewhat effective
effective
very effective
absolutely effective
Q10: As a follow on to question 9, how effective do you think testing such 
devices would be without performing design and source code security analysis?
(all technical respondents)
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32%
39%
19%
low risk
some risk
moderate risk
high risk
grave risk
Q11: As a follow on to question 10, if most digital connected devices used in the USA 
were manufactured in one country outside the USA, what risk do you believe it would 
have to the overall security of the USA if such a country were to become hostile to the 
USA?
(all technical respondents)
0%
2%
11%
22%
12%
8%
20%
8%
12%
Q12: If most of the millions of connected devices were to be 
disabled by a state-sponsored backdoor attack, how long do 
you estimate it would take to recover from such an attack?
(all technical respondents)
less than a day
'1 to 3 days
4 to 14 days
'15 to 44 days
45 to 89 days
90 days to 179 days
'180 days to 1 year
'1 year to 2 years
longer than 2 years
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Q1
Number of respondents (a respondent can have both non-technical and technical roles)
Blackhat
Non-technical 26
Percentage non-technical 40%
Technical 45
Percentage technical 69%
Total respondents 65
Total attendees 17400
DefCon
Non-technical 8
Percentage non-technical 17%
Technical 40
Percentage technical 83%
Total respondents 48
Total attendees (est) 25000
Both shows
Non-technical 34
Percentage non-technical 30%
Technical 85
Percentage technical 75%
Total respondents 113
Q2
How many years overall have you been involved in the cybersecurity industry
0-1 2-4 5-9 '10-19 20 or more totals crosscheck
BH Technical 2 6 7 20 10 45
BH Tech % 4% 13% 16% 44% 22% 100%
BH Non-Technical 4 6 2 7 7 26
BH Non-Tech % 15% 23% 8% 27% 27% 100%
Blackhat 6 12 9 25 13 65
BH percentage 9% 18% 14% 38% 20% 100%
DC Technical 7 9 9 13 2 40
DC Tech % 18% 23% 23% 33% 5% 100%
DC Non-Technical 3 1 3 1 0 8
DC Non-Tech % 38% 13% 38% 13% 0% 100%
DefCon 10 10 12 14 2 48
DC percentage 21% 21% 25% 29% 4% 100%
Both shows 16 22 21 39 15 113
Total percentage 14% 19% 19% 35% 13% 100%
Both shows technical 9 15 16 33 12 85
Both shows tech % 11% 18% 19% 39% 14% 100%
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Q3
What is your highest level of education?
HS Associates Bachelors Masters Phd totals crosscheck
Blackhat 4 3 32 21 5 65
BH percentage 6% 5% 49% 32% 8% 100%
Defcon* 7 3 20 17 0 47
DC percentage 15% 6% 42% 35% 0% 98%
Both shows 11 6 52 38 5 112
Total percentage 10% 5% 46% 34% 4% 99%
* 1 person from DefCon did not answer
TECH RESPONDENTS
Blackhat 3 3 17 17 5 45
BH percentage 7% 7% 38% 38% 11% 100%
Defcon* 6 3 18 12 0 39
DC percentage 15% 8% 45% 30% 0% 98%
Both shows 9 6 35 29 5 84
Total percentage 11% 7% 41% 34% 6% 99%
* 1 person from DefCon did not answer
NON-TECH RESPONDENTS
Blackhat 1 0 17 7 1 26
BH percentage 4% 0% 65% 27% 4% 100%
Defcon* 1 0 2 5 0 8
DC percentage 13% 0% 25% 63% 0% 100%
Both shows 2 0 19 12 1 34
Total percentage 6% 0% 56% 35% 3% 100%
* 1 person from DefCon did not answer
Q4
Network 
Security
Computer 
Security Forensics
Penetration 
Testing Hacking Encryption
Intrusion 
Detection
Intrusion 
Prevention Auditing
Wireless 
Security
Security 
Architecture
Data 
Security
App Dev 
Security
Security 
Consulting
Security 
Research
Infrastructure 
Security
Government 
Security
Financial 
Sector 
Security
Military 
Security
Premises 
Security
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 46 46 47 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
BH percentage of total 71% 71% 72% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71% 71%
DC valid responses 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
DC percentage of total 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88%
Total valid 88 88 89 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Total percentage valid 78% 78% 79% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
BH average 3.24 3.50 1.85 2.15 2.15 2.50 2.52 2.48 2.17 2.24 3.00 2.59 2.24 2.52 2.61 2.46 2.20 2.26 1.52 1.50
DC average 2.55 2.79 1.45 2.14 1.90 2.60 2.07 1.95 1.76 1.76 2.36 2.40 2.05 2.05 1.57 2.17 1.81 1.45 1.10 1.26
Total average 2.91 3.16 1.66 2.15 2.03 2.55 2.31 2.23 1.98 2.01 2.69 2.50 2.15 2.30 2.11 2.32 2.01 1.88 1.32 1.39
BH invalid response (z) 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
BH percentage invalid 26% 26% 25% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26%
DC invalid response (z) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
DC percentage invalid 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Total invalid (z) 23 23 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Total percentrage invalid 20% 20% 19% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
BH did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DC did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentage DNA 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 34 34 35 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
BH percentage of total 76% 76% 78% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76%
DC valid responses 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
DC percentage of total 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85%
Total valid 68 68 69 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Total percentage valid 80% 80% 81% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Blackhat 3.47 3.88 1.91 2.26 2.41 2.65 2.76 2.68 2.24 2.32 3.41 2.74 2.47 2.65 2.82 2.62 2.21 2.24 1.56 1.47
DefCon 2.68 2.97 1.53 2.18 1.91 2.74 2.18 1.88 1.88 1.88 2.62 2.59 2.18 1.97 1.62 2.21 1.94 1.41 1.24 1.24
Total average 3.07 3.43 1.72 2.22 2.16 2.69 2.47 2.28 2.06 2.10 3.01 2.66 2.32 2.31 2.22 2.41 2.07 1.82 1.40 1.35
BH invalid response (z) 11 11 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
BH percentage invalid 24% 24% 22% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24% 24%
DC invalid response (z) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
DC percentage invalid 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Total invalid (z) 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Total percentrage invalid 20% 20% 19% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
BH did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage DNA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 17 17 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
BH percentage of total 65% 65% 69% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
DC valid responses 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
DC percentage of total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total valid 25 25 26 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Total percentage valid 74% 74% 76% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74% 74%
Blackhat 2.88 3.00 1.67 2.12 1.65 2.47 2.41 2.59 2.59 2.35 2.41 2.76 1.88 2.88 2.47 2.53 2.76 2.59 1.71 2.12
DefCon 2.00 2.00 1.13 2.00 1.88 2.00 1.63 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.63 1.50 2.38 1.38 2.00 1.25 1.63 0.50 1.38
Total average 2.60 2.68 1.50 2.08 1.72 2.32 2.16 2.48 2.16 2.00 2.04 2.40 1.76 2.72 2.12 2.36 2.28 2.28 1.32 1.88
BH invalid response (z) 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
BH percentage invalid 27% 27% 23% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Total percentrage invalid 21% 21% 18% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%
BH did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DC did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentage DNA 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
What are your levels of expertise within the cybersecurity industry (mark all that apply where you have expertise, put a number 1 through 5 where 1 = novice and 5 = expert, 0 = no 
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Q5
What country are you a resident of?
USA GB INDIA CANADA BRAZIL NETHERLANDSSWEDEN BULGARIA AUSTRAILIA MEXICO DENMARK RUSSIA SWITZERLANDTOTAL
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH 57 2 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 65
BH percentage 87.7% 3.1% 0.0% 4.6% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
DC 36 0 3 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 48
DC percentage 75.0% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 2.1% 4.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 0.0%
Total 93 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 113
Total percentage 82.3% 1.8% 2.7% 2.7% 1.8% 1.8% 0.9% 1.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH 38 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 45
BH percentage 58.5% 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
DC 29 0 3 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 40
DC percentage 60.4% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 0.0%
Total 67 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 85
Total percentage 59.3% 1.8% 2.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH 24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
BH percentage 36.9% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DC 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
DC percentage 14.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 31 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34
Total percentage 27.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Q6
individual 
security
local 
security
regional 
security
national 
security
global 
security
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 62 61 61 62 61
BH percentage valid 95% 94% 94% 95% 94%
DC valid responses 48 48 48 48 48
DC percentage valid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total valid 110 109 109 110 109
Total percentage valid 97% 96% 96% 97% 96%
BH average 3.71 3.05 3.36 3.93 3.90
DC average 3.82 2.73 2.73 3.78 3.45
Total average 3.76 2.90 3.06 3.86 3.69
BH invalid response (z) 3 4 4 3 4
BH percentage invalid 5% 6% 6% 5% 6%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 3 4 4 3 4
Total percentrage invalid 3% 4% 4% 3% 4%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 42 42 42 42 42
BH percentage valid 93% 93% 93% 93% 93%
DC valid responses 40 40 40 40 40
DC percentage valid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total valid 82 82 82 82 82
Total percentage valid 96% 96% 96% 96% 96%
BH 3.83 3.00 3.29 3.81 3.71
DC 3.90 2.85 2.93 3.93 3.70
Total average 3.87 2.93 3.11 3.87 3.71
BH invalid response (z) 3 3 3 3 3
BH percentage invalid 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 3 3 3 3 3
Total percentrage invalid 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 26 25 25 26 25
BH percentage valid 100% 96% 96% 100% 96%
DC valid responses 8 8 8 8 8
DC percentage valid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total valid 34 33 33 34 33
Total percentage valid 100% 97% 97% 100% 97%
BH 3.54 3.16 3.40 4.04 4.00
DC 3.25 2.25 1.88 3.25 2.50
Total average 3.47 2.94 3.03 3.85 3.64
BH invalid response (z) 0 1 1 0 1
BH percentage invalid 0% 4% 4% 0% 4%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 1 1 0 1
Total percentage invalid 0% 3% 3% 0% 3%
What is your concern level regarding the following cybersecurity risk geographies (mark all that 
apply and use 1 through 5 where 1 is a low level of concern and 5 represents grave concern, 0 = 
no concern)?
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Q7
infrastructure
digital 
economy
entire 
economy civilians government businesses military
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 61 61 61 61 61 61 60
BH percentage valid 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 92%
DC valid responses 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
DC percentage valid 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98%
Total valid 108 108 108 108 108 108 107
Total percentage valid 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 95%
BH average 3.97 3.64 3.20 2.82 3.66 3.54 3.50
DC average 4.11 3.38 3.23 2.94 3.38 3.02 3.13
Total average 4.03 3.53 3.21 2.87 3.54 3.31 3.34
BH invalid response (z) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
BH percentage invalid 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total percentrage invalid 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
BH indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
DC indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 41 41 41 41 41 41 40
BH percentage valid 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 89%
DC valid responses 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
DC percentage valid 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98%
Total valid 80 80 80 80 80 80 79
Total percentage valid 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 93%
BH 3.90 3.63 2.98 2.56 3.44 3.29 3.28
DC 4.18 3.46 3.31 3.08 3.38 3.00 3.08
Total average 4.04 3.55 3.14 2.81 3.41 3.15 3.18
BH invalid response (z) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
BH percentage invalid 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total percentrage invalid 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
BH indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
DC indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
BH percentage valid 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96%
DC valid responses 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
DC percentage valid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total valid 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Total percentage valid 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97%
BH 4.08 3.80 3.52 3.20 4.08 4.08 3.76
DC 3.75 3.00 2.88 2.25 3.38 3.13 3.38
Total average 4.00 3.61 3.36 2.97 3.91 3.85 3.67
BH invalid response (z) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage invalid 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentrage invalid 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
BH indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
What is your concern level regarding the following each cybersecurity risk area in regards to the USA (use 1 through 5 where 
1 is a low level of concern and 5 represents a grave level of concern, 0 = no concern)?
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Q8
What cybersecurity risk area do you think is the greatest contributor to the risk areas noted above (use 1 through 5 where 1 = low risk contribution and 5 = high risk contribution)?
ALL RESPONDENTS
Malware 
software
OS zero day 
exploits
OS 
unpatched 
exploits
Browser zero 
day exploits
Browser 
unpatched 
exploits
Web apps 
zero day 
exploits
Web apps 
unpatched 
exploits
Cloud zero 
day exploits
Cloud 
unpatched 
exploits
DNS zero 
day exploits
DNS 
unpatched 
exploits
Phishing 
attacks
Spear-
phishing 
attacks
Internet of 
Things 
exploits
Backdoors 
hidden in 
digital 
connected 
devices
BH valid responses 58 58 58 59 57 56 57 55 55 54 54 59 60 60 57
BH percentage valid 89% 89% 89% 91% 88% 86% 88% 85% 85% 83% 83% 91% 92% 92% 88%
DC valid responses 45 45 44 41 42 41 43 41 41 43 42 45 45 40 43
DC percentage valid 94% 94% 92% 85% 88% 85% 90% 85% 85% 90% 88% 94% 94% 83% 90%
Total valid 103 103 102 100 99 97 100 96 96 97 96 104 105 100 100
Total percentage valid 91% 91% 90% 88% 88% 86% 88% 85% 85% 86% 85% 92% 93% 88% 88%
BH average 3.71 3.50 4.14 3.22 3.51 3.09 3.54 3.20 3.62 3.02 3.20 3.92 3.95 3.60 3.39
DC average 3.93 3.82 4.20 3.71 3.93 3.68 3.81 3.56 3.61 3.56 3.64 3.98 3.96 3.78 4.12
Total average 3.81 3.64 4.17 3.42 3.69 3.34 3.66 3.35 3.61 3.26 3.40 3.94 3.95 3.67 3.70
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
BH indiscernible response 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 3 3
DC percentage dna 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 6% 6% 8% 8% 2% 2% 2% 2% 6% 6%
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 4 4
Total percentage dna 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4%
BH did not answer (b) 6 5 6 5 7 7 7 9 9 10 10 5 4 4 6
BH percentage dna 9% 8% 9% 8% 11% 11% 11% 14% 14% 15% 15% 8% 6% 6% 9%
DC did not answer (b) 2 2 2 5 4 4 2 3 3 4 5 2 2 5 2
DC percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 10% 8% 8% 4% 6% 6% 8% 10% 4% 4% 10% 4%
Total did not answer (b) 8 7 8 10 11 11 9 12 12 14 15 7 6 9 8
Total percentage dna 7% 6% 7% 9% 10% 10% 8% 11% 11% 12% 13% 6% 5% 8% 7%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
Malware 
software
OS zero day 
exploits
OS 
unpatched 
exploits
Browser zero 
day exploits
Browser 
unpatched 
exploits
Web apps 
zero day 
exploits
Web apps 
unpatched 
exploits
Cloud zero 
day exploits
Cloud 
unpatched 
exploits
DNS zero 
day exploits
DNS 
unpatched 
exploits
Phishing 
attacks
Spear-
phishing 
attacks
Internet of 
Things 
exploits
Backdoors 
hidden in 
digital 
connected 
devices
BH valid responses 42 42 42 43 41 39 41 39 39 37 38 42 42 41 40
BH percentage valid 93% 93% 93% 96% 91% 87% 91% 87% 87% 82% 84% 93% 93% 91% 89%
DC valid responses 37 38 37 34 35 34 36 34 34 35 34 38 37 33 36
DC percentage valid 93% 95% 93% 85% 88% 85% 90% 85% 85% 88% 85% 95% 93% 83% 90%
Total valid 79 80 79 77 76 73 77 73 73 72 72 80 79 74 76
Total percentage valid 93% 94% 93% 91% 89% 86% 91% 86% 86% 85% 85% 94% 93% 87% 89%
BH 3.74 3.48 4.29 3.33 3.63 3.05 3.63 3.13 3.56 2.84 3.00 4.05 4.12 3.56 3.40
DC 3.95 3.71 4.19 3.68 4.00 3.71 3.92 3.50 3.62 3.63 3.71 4.05 4.00 3.97 4.08
Total average 3.84 3.59 4.24 3.48 3.80 3.36 3.77 3.30 3.59 3.22 3.33 4.05 4.06 3.74 3.72
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
BH indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC indiscernible response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC did not answer (y) 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 0 1 2 2
DC percentage dna 3% 0% 3% 3% 3% 5% 5% 8% 8% 3% 3% 0% 3% 5% 5%
Total did not answer (y) 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 0 1 2 2
Total percentage dna 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 4% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 2%
BH did not answer (b) 3 3 3 2 4 5 4 6 6 8 7 3 3 4 4
BH percentage dna 7% 7% 7% 4% 9% 11% 9% 13% 13% 18% 16% 7% 7% 9% 9%
DC did not answer (b) 2 2 2 5 4 4 2 3 3 4 5 2 2 5 2
DC percentage dna 5% 5% 5% 13% 10% 10% 5% 8% 8% 10% 13% 5% 5% 13% 5%
Total did not answer (b) 5 5 5 7 8 9 6 9 9 12 12 5 5 9 6
Total percentage dna 6% 6% 6% 8% 9% 11% 7% 11% 11% 14% 14% 6% 6% 11% 7%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
Malware 
software
OS zero day 
exploits
OS 
unpatched 
exploits
Browser zero 
day exploits
Browser 
unpatched 
exploits
Web apps 
zero day 
exploits
Web apps 
unpatched 
exploits
Cloud zero 
day exploits
Cloud 
unpatched 
exploits
DNS zero 
day exploits
DNS 
unpatched 
exploits
Phishing 
attacks
Spear-
phishing 
attacks
Internet of 
Things 
exploits
Backdoors 
hidden in 
digital 
connected 
devices
BH valid responses 21 21 22 21 21 22 22 21 21 21 21 23 24 25 23
BH percentage valid 81% 81% 85% 81% 81% 85% 85% 81% 81% 81% 81% 88% 92% 96% 88%
DC valid responses 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 8 7 7
DC percentage valid 100% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 100% 100% 88% 100% 88% 88%
Total valid 29 28 29 28 28 29 29 28 28 29 29 30 32 32 30
Total percentage valid 85% 82% 85% 82% 82% 85% 85% 82% 82% 85% 85% 88% 94% 94% 88%
BH 3.52 3.57 3.95 3.00 3.38 3.18 3.55 3.24 3.71 3.43 3.67 3.87 3.79 3.64 3.35
DC 3.88 4.43 4.29 3.86 3.57 3.57 3.29 3.86 3.57 3.25 3.38 3.57 3.75 2.86 4.29
Total average 3.62 3.79 4.03 3.21 3.43 3.28 3.48 3.39 3.68 3.38 3.59 3.80 3.78 3.47 3.57
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH indiscernible response (w) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage indiscernible 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC indiscernible response (w) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage indiscernible 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total indiscernible (w) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage indiscernible 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
DC did not answer (y) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
DC percentage dna 0% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 0% 0% 13% 0% 13% 13%
Total did not answer (y) 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
Total percentage dna 3% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 3% 3% 6% 3% 6% 6%
BH did not answer (b) 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 0 2
BH percentage dna 15% 12% 12% 15% 15% 12% 12% 15% 15% 15% 15% 8% 4% 0% 8%
DC did not answer (b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total did not answer (b) 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 0 2
Total percentage dna 12% 9% 9% 12% 12% 9% 9% 12% 12% 12% 12% 6% 3% 0% 6%
  62 
 
 
Q9
not important
somewhat 
important important
very 
important
absolutely 
vital
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 1 9 15 22 17
BH percentage of total 2% 14% 23% 34% 26%
DC valid responses 1 1 12 15 16
DC percentage of total 2% 2% 25% 31% 33%
Total valid 2 10 27 37 33
Total percentage valid 2% 9% 24% 33% 29%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 2 2 2 2 2
DC percentage invalid 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Total invalid (z) 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentrage invalid 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 1 7 9 15 12
BH percentage of total 2% 16% 20% 33% 27%
DC valid responses 1 1 9 14 12
DC percentage of total 3% 3% 23% 35% 30%
Total valid 2 8 18 29 24
Total percentage valid 2% 9% 21% 34% 28%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 2 2 2 2 2
DC percentage invalid 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total invalid (z) 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentrage invalid 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage dna 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 0 4 6 10 6
BH percentage of total 0% 15% 23% 38% 23%
DC valid responses 0 0 3 1 4
DC percentage of total 0% 0% 38% 13% 50%
Total valid 0 4 9 11 10
Total percentage valid 0% 12% 26% 32% 29%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Modern connected devices incorporate digital logic and/or firmware which is incorporated in 
network routers, network switches, computers, smartphones, car computers, IP video cameras, 
Smart TV’s, etcetera.  Most manufacturers of these devices have proprietary private designs and 
firmware which may or may not contain hidden backdoors.  Such backdoors could be used to 
disable such devices.  How important do you think that designs and software related source code 
for such devices be available for analysis for security purposes? (circle your answer)
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Q10
not effective
somewhat 
effective effective very effective
absolutely 
effective
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 16 26 12 9 2
BH percentage of total 25% 40% 18% 14% 3%
DC valid responses 7 20 9 6 5
DC percentage of total 15% 42% 19% 13% 10%
Total valid 23 46 21 15 7
Total percentage valid 20% 41% 19% 13% 6%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage invalid 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Total invalid (z) 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentrage invalid 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 9 20 6 9 1
BH percentage of total 20% 44% 13% 20% 2%
DC valid responses 5 16 8 5 5
DC percentage of total 13% 40% 20% 13% 13%
Total valid 14 36 14 14 6
Total percentage valid 16% 42% 16% 16% 7%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage invalid 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Total invalid (z) 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentrage invalid 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 10 8 6 0 2
BH percentage of total 38% 31% 23% 0% 8%
DC valid responses 2 4 1 1 0
DC percentage of total 25% 50% 13% 13% 0%
Total valid 12 12 7 1 2
Total percentage valid 35% 35% 21% 3% 6%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
As a follow on to question 9, how effective do you think testing such devices would be without 
performing design and source code security analysis? (Circle your answer)
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Q11
low risk some risk moderate risk high risk grave risk
ALL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 2 3 26 24 9
BH percentage of total 3% 5% 40% 37% 14%
DC valid responses 0 7 8 17 13
DC percentage of total 0% 15% 17% 35% 27%
Total valid 2 10 34 41 22
Total percentage valid 2% 9% 30% 36% 19%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage invalid 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Total invalid (z) 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentrage invalid 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2
DC percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Total did not answer (y) 3 3 3 3 3
Total percentage dna 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 1 2 20 17 5
BH percentage of total 2% 4% 44% 38% 11%
DC valid responses 0 5 6 15 11
DC percentage of total 0% 13% 15% 38% 28%
Total valid 1 7 26 32 16
Total percentage valid 1% 8% 31% 38% 19%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage invalid 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Total invalid (z) 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentrage invalid 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
BH did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2
DC percentage dna 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2
Total percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
BH valid responses 1 1 10 7 6
BH percentage of total 4% 4% 38% 27% 23%
DC valid responses 0 2 2 2 2
DC percentage of total 0% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Total valid 1 3 12 9 8
Total percentage valid 3% 9% 35% 26% 24%
BH invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
BH percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
DC invalid response (z) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total invalid (z) 0 0 0 0 0
Total percentrage invalid 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
DC did not answer (y) 0 0 0 0 0
DC percentage dna 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1
Total percentage dna 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
As a follow on to question 10, if most digital connected devices used in the USA were 
manufactured in one country outside the USA, what risk do you believe it would have to the 
overall security of the USA if such a country were to become hostile to the USA? (Circle your 
answer)
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Q12
TOTAL RESPONDENTS
less than a 
day '1 to 3 days 4 to 14 days
'15 to 44 
days
45 to 89 
days
90 days to 
179 days
'180 days to 
1 year
'1 year to 2 
years
longer than 2 
years
BH valid responses 0 2 5 17 7 6 19 4 3
BH percentage of total 0% 3% 8% 26% 11% 9% 29% 6% 5%
DC valid responses 0 2 6 9 7 3 4 5 8
DC percentage of total 0% 4% 13% 19% 15% 6% 8% 10% 17%
Total valid 0 4 11 26 14 9 23 9 11
Total percentage valid 0% 4% 10% 23% 12% 8% 20% 8% 10%
BH did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
BH percentage dna 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DC percentage dna 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Total did not answer (y) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
Total percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
less than a 
day '1 to 3 days 4 to 14 days
'15 to 44 
days
45 to 89 
days
90 days to 
179 days
'180 days to 
1 year
'1 year to 2 
years
longer than 2 
years
BH valid responses 0 0 3 12 4 6 13 3 3
BH percentage of total 0% 0% 7% 27% 9% 13% 29% 7% 7%
DC valid responses 0 2 6 7 6 1 4 4 7
DC percentage of total 0% 5% 15% 18% 15% 3% 10% 10% 18%
Total valid 0 2 9 19 10 7 17 7 10
Total percentage valid 0% 2% 11% 22% 12% 8% 20% 8% 12%
BH did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BH percentage dna 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
DC did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DC percentage dna 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total did not answer (y) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Total percentage dna 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
NON-TECHNICAL RESPONDENTS
less than a 
day '1 to 3 days 4 to 14 days
'15 to 44 
days
45 to 89 
days
90 days to 
179 days
'180 days to 
1 year
'1 year to 2 
years
longer than 2 
years
BH valid responses 0 2 2 6 3 0 8 2 1
BH percentage of total 0% 8% 8% 23% 12% 0% 31% 8% 4%
DC valid responses 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 1
DC percentage of total 0% 0% 0% 25% 13% 25% 0% 13% 13%
Total valid 0 2 2 8 4 2 8 3 2
Total percentage valid 0% 6% 6% 24% 12% 6% 24% 9% 6%
BH did not answer (y) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
BH percentage dna 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 4%
DC did not answer (y) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DC percentage dna 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Total did not answer (y) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Total percentage dna 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 6%
If most of the millions of connected devices were to be disabled by a state-sponsored backdoor attack, how long do you estimate it would take to recover 
from such an attack?
